¿? Questions and Answers
Which were the reasons of the quick German advance
in the USSR during 1941 and 1942?
First, in 1937 it had begun the purge of the Red Army.
In all, 36.671 officials were "purified" (executed, imprisoned
or dismiss). The proves against the officials were grotesque in the
majority of the cases and were answering to a mixture of megalomania
and revenge. Rokossovsky, had to defend from proves presented in his
against for someone dead twenty years before. These purges left commander
of brigade the staff in a lamentable condition, only a third of the
officials of superior degree were not seen "purified".
Second, the Germany
Army knew these Soviet lacks, during the Winter War against Finland
only they began to advance when used five times more troops that the
Finns. During the beginnings of the Operation Barbarroja, the German
officials were surprised at the waste and men's sacrifice that the soviets
realized.
Third, the Soviet
officials had fear to the responsibility, and didn't act if they didn't
have a solid order. Besides, a dual control existed in the soviets units,
consisting of which the political commissar of the NKVD had to approve
the military plans.
Fourth,
the German army had infinite superiority strategic and tactics on the
Soviet. We mustn't forget that the soviet tanks weren't lower than the
Germans, what if it was low were the crews and the controls. This is
a direct consequence of the purges mentioned previously.
Why the German army was defeated after having
conquered almost the whole European Russia and having caused several
million casualties?
First, the Wehrmacht
wasn't the sufficiently strong to include a front so wide as the Soviet
one for a long time. Hitler was ignoring the practical problems that
the logistics supposed in a scene stage as the oriental front. In the
conquests of France or Poland they had found these problems, but it
didn't have anything that to see with fronts of thousands of kilometres
and with a hostile climate.
Second, the delay
and final failure in the capture of Moscow, which was not only the capital,
but also the reference point of the communications and of the industry.
The conquest in 1941, probably, would have supposed the collapse of
the USSR. The General Chief of the Wehrmacht's staff, The Field Marshall
Halder, qualified the delay as the biggest strategic mistake of the
whole campaign.
Third, the scorn
of the high Soviet control (Stavka) for the life of his troops. The
Red Army, sacrificed to conscience hundreds of thousands of men in operations
that only took as object win time, it happened in Kiev, Smolensk, Moscow
or Stalingrad. The sacrifice of enormous quantities of human beings
obtained vital delays in the German advance and allowed that Hitler's
arrogant before big carnage, it will play in favour of Stalin.
Forth, the failure
in the conquest of Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad, were based on the
suicidal resistance of the Red Army, which managed to stop the German
advance. The principal advantage of the Germans was the speed, as soon
as they were losing this advantage there were imposed another series
of factors between which the resistance was standing out. Germany couldn't
allowed a long war against a country that as the USSR was overcoming
in population and, eventually, in industrial production.
Fifth, the fact
that the Soviet factories were to another side of the Urals Mountains
and, therefore, far from the scope of the German aviation, he supposed
a definitive advantage when there began the massive bombardments of
the allies on Germany.
Sixth, the entry
in the war of the USA supposed for the USSR a certain relief, since
the USA turned into the principal logistic support of the USSR during
1942. The food of the USA has been underestimated, but the certain thing
is that they collaborated to supporting the front and, especially, the
rearguard.
Seventh, the ambiguous
Japanese position about the USSR. In August 1939, the battle of Jalkin-Gol,
was produced, between Japanese and Soviets where the above mentioned,
they defeated the first ones. The General Zhukov was the maker of this
victory and possibly the principal reason of which the Japanese were
not attacking to the USSR later on. The troops destined in the Asian
zone of the USSR demonstrated to be very necessary during the course
of the war.