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The winter of 1941-1942 was the hardest of the century up to this moment.
The Wehrmacht suffered the unspeakable thing to contain the general
offensive of the Red Army after the failure in the assault to Moscow.
Nevertheless, Stalin believed that the German army was ended and that
"the Russian winter" had finished with Hitler like with Napoleon.
Although Hitler was denying being defeated so soon and he objected to
any possible retreat of Russia; and what in a beginning seemed a more
madness, it saved to the German army of being crushed while it was fleeing
like it happened to Napoleon.
Once failed the Soviet counter-offensive
and come the good time, it was the moment to return to take the initiative,
nevertheless the situation had changed, the war in Russia was lengthened
and every Soviet destroyed division was replaced with new other one,
besides the distance of the front was making the provisioning very difficult
for the Germans. The shortage of supplies of oil was appeared as a Hitler's
new ghost. The conquest of Ukraine was giving him the biggest world's
granary, but now he needed the oil of the Caucasus. This way a new plan
was born: the Case Blue. The aim was to conquer the petroliferous wells
of the Caucasus, but before it would be necessary to reach Don River
and the shore to strengthen from Voronez up to Stalingrad protecting
the flank.
Hitler gave the orders to reorganize
the German troops of the South Armies Group supervised by the General
Von Bock, dividing it in two
Groups of Armies. The Field Marshall List would supervise the Army Group
A, and the Army Group B, would continue supervised by Von
Bock (in July it would changed supervised by the general Weichs).
The Army Group A would have the mission to come up to Baku and to come
the petroliferous fields. The Army Group B would limit itself reaching
the Don River and to establish a defensive front.
The plan was very simple in appearance,
nevertheless the principal problem was that would be necessary to cover
an enormous front and the possibilities of break were big. Although
Hitler, silenced to his General staff and imposed the idea that the
Soviet were on the collapse's edge. As it has been said previously,
the Army Group B had to limit to being formed a defensive front along
the Don, though immediately Hitler gave to it the second aim: to conquer
Stalingrad.
Hitler forgot the oil need and
preferred the ideological need of a great victory against "Stalin's
city". The mission of the Army Group B changed to be an operation
of coverage to an offensive operation of big dimensions, whereas it
entrusted the mission to occupy all the petroliferous wells of the Caucasus
and defend the line that goes from Batumi up to Baku.
The
mistake that supposed the diversion of the Army Group B comes given
by Hitler's feeling omnipotence and by the underestimation of the enemy.
The Army Group B changed its protection mission to be the principal
action, to something very different and, actually, difficultly to obtain.
If we look at the map we discover that a possible coordinated advance
of the Soviet forces of Stalingrad's zone towards Rostov, though there
was taking advantage of the protection that was offering the bend of
the Don on the straight part, would separate immediately the Army Group
A from the Army Group B , making both isolated.

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