The Politics of the Creation Story
Richard L. Rubenstein
Early Christian writers used the biblical story of Creation and the Fall to express their basic political and ethical attitudes; their legacy still influences our values today.
ADAM, EVE AND THE SERPENT
Elaine Pagels
New York: Random House, 1988
224 pp., $17.95
When most Americans recall the words of the
Declaration of Independence, "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men
are created equal...," they have little reason to dissent. Without the Declaration's
"self-evident" truths, it is hardly likely that most Americans would have
accepted the claims to political equality of a disenfranchised racial minority consisting
largely of the descendants of emancipated slaves. Nor is it likely that the United States
would have come to embrace within its fold as free citizens the heirs of practically every
religious and national tradition on earth. The signatories of the Declaration understood
that what they took to be self-evident was by no means universally regarded as
self-evident. Flourishing at a time when the idea of equality had yet to take deep root in
European society or politics, men like Jefferson, himself a slave owner, understood human
inequality to be the norm rather than the exception. What distinguished the United States
in its moment of creation was that biblical ideas concerning creation and human equality
had a greater influence on the political consciousness of its founders than was the case
in any other country with a Western Christian cultural inheritance.
Elaine Pagels, a professor of religious studies
at Princeton, has written a lucid, original, and authoritative study, Adam, Eve and the
Serpent, of how ideas concerning political authority, human equality, moral freedom, the
relations between the sexes, labor, the worth of the individual, suffering, and mortality
developed during the first four centuries of the Christian era and how these ideas
continue to influence our values to this day. Pagels points out that the classical Jewish
and Christian writers of the first Christian centuries seldom wrote treatises on these
subjects. They did, however, effectively use the biblical story of Creation and the Fall,
Genesis 1:1-3:22, as a primary vehicle for expressing their basic political and ethical
attitudes. Pagels also shows that, as the situation of the young church changed from that
of a bitterly persecuted minority to the official religion of the empire, the
interpretation of the Creation story also changed, reflecting the response of thoughtful
Christians to their transformed situation. Like Nietzsche and the young Hegel, albeit with
far greater sympathy for Christianity, Pagels sees the religion as responsible for a
radical transvaluation of values within the Roman Empire and, ultimately, in the Western
world as a whole. In recent years most scholars have tended to stress the similarities in
life-style of the early Christians and their pagan neighbors. By contrast, Pagel's
principal interest is in how pagans and Christians differed and how that difference has
contributed to making us what we are today.
The differences between pagan and Christian
involved both sexual and political attitudes and behavior. The celibate lives of Jesus and
Paul gave even those Christians who did marry a model radically at odds with the pagan
norm. The early Christians rejected sexual practices pagans regarded as normal, such as
prostitution, homosexuality, and extramarital promiscuity. During the first two centuries
of the Christian era, this catalogue of accepted practices also included infanticide. From
the perspective of those of us whose values have been shaped by the Judeo-Christian
tradition, Roman prostitution was especially vicious. Slave children were often especially
reared and trained to serve as male and female prostitutes. Moreover, there was little
constraint on the routine sexual use or abuse of slaves.
In the political realm the differences were
also profound. Jesus' message "What profit is it for a man if he gains the whole
world but loses his own soul?" (Matt. 16:26) was radically at odds with the
Greco-Roman view which esteemed the public realm over the private and held that the only
life that was truly human and worth living was that of the zoon politikon, Aristotle's
"political animal." For a Greek or Roman citizen, a life lived entirely in the
private realm was one "deprived of things essential to a truly human life."
According to New Testament scholar Wayne Meeks, the earliest Christians were persons of
"high status inconsistency," that is, their achieved status was usually higher
than their attributed status. As such, they were not likely to measure human worth in
terms of one's contributions to the public realm. As is often the case with persons of low
attributed status, they were more likely to embrace the Christian belief, derived from the
Creation story, in the divinely bestowed, intrinsic, infinite worth of each and every
individual.
Furthermore, every Christian convert had
rejected the natural ties of family, kinship, and common descent for membership in a new
community that claimed to transcend such ties. Paul had observed that in Christ older ties
of blood and social hierarchy had been broken and that "there is neither Jew nor
Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female; for ye are all
one in Christ Jesus" (Gal. 3:28). Pagels argues that our secularized idea of a
multiethnic "democratic society" is profoundly indebted to the early Christian
vision of a new society "no longer formed by the natural bonds of family, tribe, or
nation but by the voluntary choice of its members." Such a vision, she says, was
wholly at odds with the Greco-Roman view, which looked down upon those who had broken with
their organic ties.
I would concur. Nevertheless, I regret the
absence of any mention in Pagel's work of the ultimate source of the idea of a society
transcending kinship and based upon voluntary choice, the biblical doctrine of covenant.
It was, after all, the rejection by the ethnically mixed "Hebrews" (according to
modern biblical scholarship) of both the world of the Pharoahs and their own ancestral
gods in order to form a covenant community under Yahweh that provided the model for the
kind of new society to which the early Christians aspired. What had changed for the
Christians was not the idea of a covenant community but their understanding of Christ as
its true foundation.
Pagels also shows how the early Christians
departed radically from Jewish as well as Roman values and practice. In the New Testament,
Jesus refers to the story of Adam and Eve only once. When the Pharisees inquired of his
opinion concerning the grounds for a man "to put away his wife" (Matt. 19:3),
Jesus replied that there were none. Jesus' unqualified rejection of divorce constituted a
radical departure from the Jewish consensus. He based his view on a novel interpretation
of the story of Adam and Eve:
Have ye not read that he which made them at the
beginning made them male and female. And He said, For this reason shall a man leave his
father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife and the twain shall be one flesh. (Matt.
19:4-5)
Jesus than offered his interpretation of Gen.
2:24:
Where they are no more twain but one flesh.
What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder. (Matt. 19:6)
Jesus thus broke with Jewish tradition.
According to Pagels, the breach was even greater when he suggested that making oneself a
"eunuch" for the sake of "Kingdom of Heaven" could be preferable to
marriage. Pagels points out that Jews placed a very high value on procreation. In reading
the Creation story, they emphasized God's injunction to Adam to "be fruitful and
multiply..." (Gen. 2:28). Their ancestors had been nomads whose survival depended
upon the increase of human beings and their flocks. Since both polygamy and divorce tended
to increase opportunities for procreation, neither institution was prohibited. Moreover,
by using the Genesis story to support their views, the Jews were, in effect, claiming that
these values were both universal and grounded in the very nature of things. By contrast,
Jesus, whose views can be seen as having a negative effect on procreation, used the name
hermaneutic strategy to justify his devaluation of marriage and his rejection of divorce.
For those who shared Jesus' conviction that the
Kingdom of God was at hand, there was little reason to foster procreation. Both the rabbis
and early Christians such as Paul were convinced that human mortality was a divinely
inflicted punishment for Adam's sin. Given this view, procreation can be seen as the
species' response to the fall of Adam. Christ's resurrection was taken by Paul and others
as a sign that mortality, the most drastic consequence of the Fall, was in the process of
being overcome. Hence, the principal reason for procreation was no longer compelling. The
theological motive for celibacy was grounded in the messianic eschatology of the early
Christian movement.
In addition to the eschatological motives,
there were practical, sociopolitical motives for celibacy, especially for non-Jewish
converts such as Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, and Clement of Alexandria. Pagels reminds us
that Christians who preached celibacy disrupted the traditional order of the family and
the polis. As Soren Kierkegaard came to understand when he rejected marriage to Regina
Olsen in the nineteenth century, marriage grounds the individual in the chain of
generations and in society's encompassing networks. Celibacy offered a way out of those
networks and a degree of personal autonomy impossible for the married person. With Christ
as a model, celibacy was no longer regarded as a possibility only for the singular
exception. For many Christians celibacy came to be regarded as a way of life superior to
marriage. Pagels stresses that "conversion transformed both consciousness and
behavior." Christians did not identify celibacy with repression as have some modern
critics. On the contrary, many saw celibacy as the path to self-liberation from the sinful
claims of both their own impulses and imperial Rome.
By the beginning of the second century,
Christians were applying the Creation story to their own political situation. Justin
Martyr characterized the Roman emperors and their gods as demonic, identifying the gods of
Rome with the malevolent fallen angels of Genesis 6:2-4 who took unto themselves as wives
"the daughters of men." For Justin the pagan gods are inventions of demons.
Responding to the trial and execution of Ptolemy, a Christian teacher, who had been asked
only one question, "Are you a Christian," Justin attacked the Roman gods whose
traditions supported sexual promiscuity and the slaughter of innocent men and women.
Inevitably, Justin was himself arrested and brought to trial before Rusticus, urban
prefect of Rome. All that was required of Justin was that he heed Rusticus' injunction to
"obey the gods and submit to the emperors." Justin's refusal resulted in his
execution.
As Pagels points out, the encounter between
Justin and Rusticus was over a fundamental, nonnegotiable issue. By refusing properly to
honor the emperors, Justin had attacked the empire's sacralized foundations. This was an
act of sedition done in the name of Jesus, regarded by the Romans as a criminal who had
been justly executed for an earlier act of sedition. Both Justin and Rusticus fully
understood the meaning of Justin's refusal. In Pagels' words, Christians like Justin
"set out, in effect, to secularize--and so radically to diminish, the power of social
and political obligations."
Twenty years later Clement of Alexandria took
the biblical statement that God had created humanity "in his own image" as
evidence of human equality and as a profound indictment of imperial rule. Arguing from
Genesis, Clement asserted that since God made every man in his image, it was monstrous
that people are subject to another master.
One of the unique aspects of early Christianity
was the claim that in baptism Christians die to their old selves and are reborn in Christ.
Similarly, Holy Communion came to be seen as a rite in which the believer becomes one with
Christ. The identity of the believer with Christ is expressed by Paul: "I have been
crucified with Christ, and I live now not with my own life but with the life of Christ who
lives in me" (Gal. 2:19). One can with justice view the Christian assertion of
identification with Christ as a claim that the old biological order of birth and death,
the consequence of the Fall, had given way to identification with Christ's resurrection.
As Christ had defeated death, so too would all who are "in Christ." Paul had
written:
Are you ignorant that when we were baptized in
Christ Jesus we were baptized in his death? In other words, when we were baptized we went
into the tomb with Him and joined Him in death, so that as Christ was raised from the dead
by the Father's glory, we too might live a new life. (Rom 6:3,4)
Nevertheless, there is a political dimension to
the Christian's claim to be born again in Christ. As noted above, existence in Christ is
free, at least in principle, from bondage to existence within the natural boundaries of
family, tribe, polis, and empire. More than that, the reborn Christian could see himself
as equal, if not superior, to the emperor. Clement of Alexandria claimed that since the
coming of Christ, "divinity now pervades all humanity equally, ... deifying humanity.
For Christians the emperor cult was a pretentious blasphemy. Every time a Christian
partook of Holy Communion, he or she became one with divinity and hence superior to the
emperor whose divinity was a blasphemous pretension. Holy Communion was thus an act of
radical political desacralization. According to Pagels the Christian message was
politically and socially explosive. It is my opinion that rituals like baptism and Holy
Communion were equally explosive. This does not contradict Pagels' research. Pagels
excluded the issue of ritual from the scope of her investigation.
We cannot explore the full scope of Pagels'
treatment of how the interpretation of the Creation story contributed to the formation of
our contemporary ethical and political consciousness. It is, however, important to take
note of her analysis of what happened when Christianity ceased to be a despised, alien
sect and the emperor himself became a brother in Christ. According to Pagels, during most
of the first four centuries of the Christian era, freedom was regarded as the Gospel's
primary message. The Christian view of freedom included free will, freedom from demonic
powers, freedom from social and sexual obligations, freedom from tyrannical government,
and freedom from fate.
By the fifth century the Roman Catholic Church
had become the ally rather than the unremitting adversary of the empire. It was no longer
possible for the church to condemn as demonic an empire which actively persecuted the
church's rivals and utilized the power of the state to assure its predominance. Nor was it
any longer functional to proclaim freedom as the primary message of either the Gospels or
Genesis. The radically changed situation demanded a radically changed theology. According
to Pagels, it was Augustine of Hippo who gave to Western Christendom the theology
appropriate to the new situation.
Pagels sees Augustine as unlike his
predecessors in that he did not see Genesis 1-3 as an affirmation of human freedom but of
universal human bondage. Augustine effected the transformation of Western Christianity
from an ideology of moral freedom to one of universal bondage. Before Augustine, the
Creation story was taken to mean that Adam was initially a free moral agent and that his
progeny retained a potential for that capacity. Christians who had led a saintly and
celibate life were regarded as having realized human moral freedom and of having recovered
a measure of Adam's prelapsarian glory. Augustine did not take issue with his predecessors
on the idea that human mortality is a direct consequence of Adam's sin. He did, however,
claim that Adam's rebellion had deprived humanity of its moral freedom as well as its
original immortality. Augustine held that sin had utterly corrupted human sexuality and
had rendered human beings incapable of political freedom.
Augustine's contemporary John Chrysostom had
argued that the sword of government was a necessary imposition on the corrupt majority but
that the truly righteous in Christ needed no such domination. John distinguished the sword
of the state from the persuasion practiced by the church even in dealing with heretics.
Following a tradition common to early Christianity and rabbinic Judaism, John held that
neither faith nor morals can be forced upon the wrongdoer, persuasion being the church's
method of correction. As Pagels puts it, for John, "Church government, unlike Roman
government, remains wholly voluntary and, although hierarchically structured, is
essentially egalitarian, reflecting, in effect, the original harmony of Paradise."
Augustine's views were far more pessimistic. He
came to reject the notion that even Christians had the capacity freely to choose the good.
Augustine read back his view of the utter corruption of even baptized Christians into the
writings of Paul. Describing his own preconversion experience, Paul had written, "I
do not do what I will, but I do the very thing I hate.... I can will what is right, but I
cannot do it." (Rom. 7:15-25). Augustine applied Paul's description to baptized
Christians, a radically novel interpretation. Augustine held that the punishment for
Adam's assertion of his own autonomy against God was the loss of that autonomy for both
Adam and his progeny. For Augustine, this meant that even Christians required the
discipline of the state and the theological and moral guidance of an authoritarian church.
Augustine had written that "the union of male and female is the seed-bed, so to
speak, from which the city must grow." That union had been corrupted by the Fall and
the consequences were political as well as marital. Even Christians cannot be trusted to
govern themselves in either the body politic or the Body of Christ.
It should, however, be noted that Augustine
ascribed no inherent sacrality to the state. The state is an indispensable, secular
necessity given the corruptions of humanity and nature that followed the Fall. Christians
have a higher obligation to god. No longer are the political bonds sacred in character.
Moreover, even the church is an imperfect institution, albeit a necessary one given the
condition of fallen humanity. Pagels concludes her study with the observation that
Augustine's pessimistic views became the dominant influence on both Catholic and
Protestant Christianity and came to "color all of western culture, Christian or not,
ever since." Adam, Eve, and the serpent have continued to influence the religious and
political consciousness in the Western world to our own day.
Pagels deserves high praise for an original,
imaginative, and authoritative work of religious scholarship. She has used her specialist
knowledge to make available to the educated public an informed account of one of the more
important ways in which the Bible and its interpreters have in every generation helped to
shape our fundamental institutions and values.